I. INTRODUCTION
Law firms have traditionally been organized as general partnerships. 1 Although many firms have now registered as limited liability partnerships to shield partners against vicarious liability in whole or part, 2 the general partnership has been the predominant law firm organizational form. 3 For years, lawyers have proudly announced their elevation to partner as evidence of significant personal and professional achievement.
4 "Making partner" or being "made a partner" has long been an important career milestone for lawyers in private practice. As a matter of professional prestige, referring to oneself and one's colleagues as "partners" is appealing.
Despite well-publicized generational differences, most law firm associates aspire to partnership. 5 The perceived deficiencies or inefficiencies of traditional partnerships have not been lost on law firm leaders and those who advise them, and, in response, the 1970s saw the advent of two-tier partnerships.
12 Two-tier partnerships are characterized by a top tier of partners who hold equity in the firm and a lower tier of partners who do not. Generally speaking, equity partnership is now seen as being reserved for rainmakers and other lawyers of special stature, although many law firms have numerous equity partners who were effectively grandfathered into that status when their firms converted from single-tier to two-tier partnerships. Law firms widely adopted two-tier partnership structures throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 13 and their popularity continues today. Most large law firms are now either two-tier or multitier partnerships, 14 although two-tier partnerships are also found in small law firms. 15 Many more lawyers are becoming non-equity partners rather than achieving equity partner status, with the proportion of nonequity partners in law firms growing at three times the rate of equity partners. 16 In summary, "the prize of equity partnership, which includes the traditional prerogatives of ownership, is increasingly rare." 17 Non-equity partners are not uniformly described or identified; some law firms refer to them as "income partners," while others describe them as "non-share partners," "salary partners," or "contract partners." Unlike equity partners, who share in a firm's profits, non-equity partners typically receive guaranteed payments out of firm profits that resemble a salary.
18 Non-equity partners may further receive bonuses depending on their achievements or the firm's profitability. 19 They have whatever rights and privileges a firm's partnership agreement affords them. 20 They generally have no interests or rights in the firm's assets, profits, or property beyond the right to be compensated as agreed. 21 12. See Silverbrand, supra note 5, at 171 (reporting that two-tier partnerships were first adopted in Chicago in the 1970s).
13. Henderson, supra note 8, at 1694-95. 14. Id. at 1695 (using the Am Law 200 as a measure); Silverbrand, supra note 5, at 172 (describing a 2004 report that an estimated seventy percent of firms with seventy-five lawyers or more were two-tier partnerships).
15. Hillman There are three paths to non-equity partnership. The first is an ascending one for associates in law firms. Some firms first promote all associates worthy of partnership to non-equity partner status with the expectation that they will pass through the non-equity tier and become equity partners after an established period of time. 22 Other firms promote associates to a non-equity tier and reserve judgment on whether equity partnership will follow, with some lawyers becoming equity partners as their careers progress and others remaining non-equity partners for the duration of their time at the firm. 23 Still other firms promote especially promising junior lawyers directly to equity partnership, while raising others to non-equity partnership. 24 Regardless of the particular approach employed, the ascending path has at least four perceived benefits for law firms: (1) it improves client service by reducing lawyer attrition, (2) it minimizes errors in promotion decisions by extending the evaluation period for equity partnership, (3) it aligns partners' voting power with their economic contributions to the firm, lessening the likelihood of defections by rainmaking partners, and (4) it favorably influences market dynamics by increasing the firm's profits per partner-which are calculated solely on the basis of equity partners-allowing the firm to more easily lure lateral lawyers and attract high-caliber firms for potential mergers. 25 Analyzing two-tier partnership from below, junior lawyers may derive value from non-equity partnership in the form of increased job stability, and the opportunity to achieve greater work-life balance and career flexibility than equity partnership is thought to afford. 26 They also benefit from the stature and prestige that comes with being described as a 22 . See Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 819 (Non-equity partnership "may represent a transition phase between status as an associate and admission to the partnership. The status may be used as a means of lengthening the 'partnership track' that defines progression from associate to partner.").
23. See CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 1, § 6.02 [3] (stating that non-equity status "allows the partners to observe how newly promoted associates handle these responsibilities and integrate themselves into the partnership"). Occasionally, economic conditions force alterations to these plans, as when firms convert non-equity partners to equity partners as a means of raising capital. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Some Top Law Firms Tap Partners for Cash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at B1 (reporting that DLA Piper planned to convert 200 non-equity partners into equity partners, requiring each lawyer to contribute more than $100,000 in capital to the firm); Ameet Sachdev, Law Firms' Woes Likely to Last, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2009, § 1, at 28 (reporting that DLA Piper asked 300 non-equity partners to become equity partners by paying $100,000 or more because the firm wanted to reduce its debt and increase lawyers' financial incentives).
24 Financially, non-equity partners potentially benefit by receiving a guaranteed income, as compared to equity partners, who may see their income decrease in years in which the firm performs poorly. 28 Some associates may favor non-equity partnership as a financial matter because it does not require them to invest capital in the firm. 29 The second path to non-equity partnership is horizontal in the sense that some firms require all lateral partners to join as non-equity partners. This approach allows the lawyer moving laterally to decide whether her decision was a wise one before cementing it through a capital contribution. 30 Equally important, it allows the firm to evaluate the migrating lawyer in some depth-to see whether, for example, the lawyer will actually deliver a predicted or promised book of businessbefore committing to equity participation. 31 The third path is a descending one, euphemistically referred to as "de-equitization." De-equitization refers to the demotion of partners from equity status to non-equity status. 32 Law firms commonly deequitize partners in times of economic stagnation or as a result of slowing practices, 33 but they also do so as a means of pruning unproductive partners. 34 De-equitization can be a contentious, upsetting, 31. See id. (quoting a law-firm-managing partner who says non-equity partnership "allows us to be more flexible with someone we're willing to bet on").
32. See Hillman, Evolving Status of Partners, supra note 4, at 816-17 (using the term "deequitized" to describe partner demotions).
33. See, e.g., Leigh Jones, Downsizing: Who's Next?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 2007, at 1, 1 (discussing de-equitization at large law firms in response to stagnant profits and as a means of becoming more competitive); Richard Lloyd, Heavy Lies the Crown, AM. LAW., Feb. 2009, at 20, 20 (discussing firms de-equitizing partners in response to economic crisis).
34. For many lawyers, being de-equitized is "'almost like getting fired. '" 36 In other instances, lawyers grudgingly accept de-equitization as a condition of law firm acquisitions or mergers.
37
The widespread acceptance of non-equity partnerships does not, however, connote agreement among lawyers or courts on what it means to be a non-equity partner, or even whether non-equity partners are in fact partners.
38
As one respected scholar has observed, non-equity partnership "is an oxymoron" because partnership is defined by "coownership and shared personal responsibility," and non-equity partners have neither of these things. 39 Other commentators state that non-equity partners "are far from genuine partners" in their firms, 40 that non-equity partners "are not considered partners under partnership or employment law,"
41 that non-equity partners "are not true partners," 42 and that nonequity partners are "'actually . . . highly paid associates.'" 43 If these bold opinions are accurate, what are courts and the legal profession to make of non-equity partners, and what are non-equity partners to conclude about their own status? For example, if non-equity partners are not partners, they do not owe one another or the equity partners in their firms a duty of good faith and fair dealing, nor are they owed this important duty. 44 If non-equity partners are not partners, they do not owe their colleagues or firms other fiduciary duties imposed on partners. 45 non-equity partners are not partners but are instead employees, are they accordingly protected against adverse employment actions under federal and state anti-discrimination laws? These issues and doubtless others spawned by non-equity partners' awkward legal status are important. Part II of this Article analyzes whether non-equity partners truly are partners in their law firms as a matter of partnership law. The resolution of this critical issue necessarily determines the answers to most other questions concerning non-equity partners' rights and responsibilities under partnership law and settles other material issues, such as whether non-equity partners owe the ethical duties imposed on partners under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3. Applying the factors that courts traditionally weigh when attempting to determine the existence of a partnership, this part rejects the conventional view that non-equity partners are not in fact partners. It thoroughly explains why non-equity partners generally are true partners as a matter of partnership and other law despite the differences between them and equity partners.
Part III explores the descending path to non-equity partnership, i.e., de-equitization. More particularly, it navigates partners' duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with de-equitizations. Consistent with the law of partnership expulsions, this part explains that firms may de-equitize partners without incurring related liability so long as they do not do so for predatory purposes.
Finally, Part IV examines employment law constraints on law firms' treatment of non-equity partners. It concludes that, contrary to the views held by many lawyers and scholars, whether law firm partners are protected under anti-discrimination laws depends not on whether they are equity partners or non-equity partners, but on their workplace control as measured by the six factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells.
47
Equity versus non-equity partner status, without more, is simply not a meaningful employment law divide.
II. NON-EQUITY PARTNERS AS TRUE PARTNERS
The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 48 The newer Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) responsibilities with respect to other lawyers in their firms); R. 5.3 (governing partners' supervisory responsibilities for non-lawyer assistants).
47 Regardless of the definition selected, the existence of a partnership is generally treated as a question of fact, 51 although not all courts agree on this point. Some courts see the existence of a partnership as a mixed question of law and fact, with the ultimate determination being a question of law; 52 still others consider the existence of a partnership to be a legal question. 53 It is perhaps most accurate to say that the existence of a partnership is a question of law that depends heavily on the facts. In any event, courts typically search for several factors when attempting to determine the existence of a partnership, 54 including (1) a common enterprise, (2) risk-sharing, (3) expense-sharing, (4) the sharing of profits and losses, (5) a joint right of control over the business, and (6) the joint ownership of capital. 55 Whether the parties hold themselves out to the public as partners is another factor to be weighed.
56
Not all courts consider all factors. Not every element must be satisfied for there to be a partnership, 57 and no single factor is conclusive. 58 The parties' intent is the primary factor for determining whether a partnership exists. 59 As an Ohio court explained, "[t]he relevant inquiry is 'not whether the parties 49 . REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997 intend that the law describe their relationship as a partnership, but whether they intend a relationship that includes the essential elements of a partnership.'" 60 A partnership agreement is important evidence of the parties' intent. Indeed, it is generally unnecessary for courts to examine the various factors indicating or refuting a partnership relation where a written partnership agreement can be found, 61 although a partnership agreement must be clear and the parties must conduct themselves consistently with its terms to preempt a court's analysis of other factors.
62

A. Non-equity Partners in the Courts
The question of whether non-equity law firm partners are partners as a matter of law is a recurring one. 63 In D'Esposito v. Gusrae, Kaplan & Bruno PLLC, for example, James D'Esposito was forced from his position as a non-equity member of Gusrae, Kaplan & Bruno PLLC ("Gusrae"). 64 Although Gusrae was organized as a professional limited liability company rather than as a partnership, the firm apparently identified and treated its members as partners.
65
The reasons for D'Esposito's termination are not apparent from the opinion, but he sued Gusrae on a variety of theories and sought a range of remedies. 66 The trial court rejected his claims on the basis that he was law firm's residency for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and, since the firm's registered agent in Massachusetts was a "contract partner," discussing how the law firm's contract partners were essentially senior associates-they were paid a fixed salary, had no voice in firm governance or affairs, were not allowed to bind the firm, could not see the firm's books, etc. 70 He sued FBWH and several of its former lawyers, alleging that FBWH failed to compensate him for fees that he generated while with the firm. 71 The defendants countered that Zito was not entitled to a share of the fees he produced because he was simply a salaried, at-will employee of the firm despite his contract-partner designation.
72 They asserted that Zito was not a party to the FBWH partnership agreement, never guaranteed or agreed to be responsible for firm debts, did not share in the firm's losses, was not issued an IRS Schedule K-1 for tax purposes as a partner would be, and contributed no capital to the firm. 73 Those same facts were pleaded by several former contract partners that Zito also sued as evidence that they were not truly partners in FBWH and therefore could not be held liable for FBWH's potential obligations to Zito. 74 evidence that he was an employee of FBWH, not a partner, and therefore could not be liable to Zito. 78 The first document was his employment agreement with the firm, which offered him a choice of being called a "contract partner" or a "senior attorney." 79 The agreement, which fixed Kastner's annual compensation and created his position for a one-year term, made clear that he would "not be entitled to any equity, accounts receivable or assets of the Firm," and described his relationship with FBWH as an "affiliation." 80 The agreement contained no provision with respect to Kastner sharing in FBWH's losses. 81 The second document that Kastner offered was a Form W-2 issued to him by the firm.
82
The Zito court began its analysis by observing that under New York law, the indicia of partnership are joint control over the enterprise, profitsplitting, and loss-sharing. 83 Even where there is joint control and an agreement to split profits, the absence of an agreement to share losses may defeat a partnership claim because loss-sharing is an essential element of partnership. 84 The court quickly concluded that Kastner's employment arrangement with FBWH satisfied none of the three factors. 85 Furthermore, the fact that the firm issued him a Form W-2 for tax purposes rather than a Schedule K-1 plainly indicated that he was an FBWH employee rather than a partner.
86
In an effort to establish that contract partners shared losses, Zito argued that, based on the firm's method of calculating his bonuses, the firm factored overhead costs into contract partners' compensation. 87 The court disagreed, finding that FBWH's allocation of overhead costs across its payroll did not constitute loss-sharing and did not otherwise prove a required partnership element. 88 The fact that lawyers such as Kastner elected contract partner status rather than being called senior attorneys did not change the analysis. 89 The court, therefore, granted Kastner's motion to dismiss. One defendant, Anthony Frink, moved for summary judgment on the basis that he did not qualify as a partner for purposes of vicarious liability. 92 Frink was an "income partner." 93 Under the firm's partnership agreement, income partners received a fixed compensation set annually by the executive committee, plus a bonus. 94 The agreement further provided that income partners would not share in the firm's profits or losses. 95 Each income partner made a $10,000 capital contribution to the firm to be repaid upon withdrawal or dissolution, without any adjustment for firm growth or profits since the time it was made.
96
Income partners had no rights to vote on firm affairs or decisions, and were not eligible to sit on the firm's executive committee.
97
Several other income partners joined Frink's summary judgment motion. 98 The trial court granted the motion, holding that the income partners did not qualify as partners, and therefore did not share liability for the acts of the firm's other partners or employees. 99 The plaintiffs appealed.
100
The appellate court first noted that the "substance and not the form of a business relationship determines whether the relationship qualifies as a partnership."
101 Here, the income partners received a fixed salary plus bonus and did not share in the firm's profits or losses. 102 While the income partners made capital contributions, the firm agreed to repay those contributions in full upon the income partners' withdrawal from the firm or the firm's dissolution, regardless of the firm's intervening profit or loss.
103
The firm's executive committee set income partners' compensation, and the income partners had no right to vote on the management of the firm or the conduct of its business. 104 These factors culminated in the court's finding that the income partners at Gottlieb & Schwartz lacked "the essential characteristics of 'partners'" under the Illinois Partnership Act, and therefore they could not be held liable for Loftus's and Engel's alleged malpractice.
105
The court affirmed summary judgment for Frink and the other two defendants identified as income partners in the partnership agreement that Frink submitted as an exhibit to his motion.
106
The other income partners not similarly identified had their summary judgments reversed and their cases remanded for presentation of evidence concerning their partnership status.
107
B. Analysis
It would be easy to conclude from the cases decided to date that nonequity partners are not partners as a matter of partnership law, but are instead employees of the law firms in which they practice.
108 That is not the conclusion that should be drawn, however, because the relationships described in those cases are variously inconsistent with typical nonequity partnerships. In D'Esposito, for example, the plaintiff, who was judged not to be a partner, did not sign the firm's partnership agreement.
109 As a rule, two-tier firms require non-equity partners to sign their partnership agreements, and law firm advisors often recommend this approach. 110 In Zito, the would-be partners were not elected as "contract partners," but selected that designation by circling it as an option on their employment agreements.
111
In true two-tier partnerships, lawyers are elected to non-equity partnership, either by a vote of the equity partners or by a vote of all partners; they do not get to simply choose their own status or rank. In Davis, the non-equity partners had no right to vote on the management of the firm or the conduct of its In many two-tier firms, non-equity partners vote on all issues that come before the partnership except the election of lawyers to equity partnership. 113 In other two-tier firms, non-equity partners are allowed to vote on at least some issues. 114 The Davis court was also influenced by the fact that the income partners who were repaid their capital upon withdrawal or dissolution received no capital increase based on intervening firm profitability, 115 yet many firms do not repay capital beyond that which a terminated or withdrawing partner actually contributed.
In summary, lawyers and courts should not form assumptions about the legal ramifications of non-equity partnership based on cases that confuse general practices.
To determine whether non-equity partners are partners in their firms for purposes of partnership law and professional responsibility, it is helpful to compare current law firm practices against factors that courts regularly examine when attempting to determine the existence of a partnership. It is also important to consider law firms' tax treatment of non-equity partners and the ramifications of law firms holding out nonequity partners to the public and profession as partners. When all of these factors are analyzed, it will become clear that the majority rule should hold law firm non-equity partners to be partners rather than employees, and courts should treat them accordingly.
Partnership Agreements and Parties' Intent
Most law firms structured as two-tier partnerships require non-equity partners to sign their partnership agreements, just as they require equity partners to sign. Partnership agreements typically do not distinguish between equity and non-equity partners except in sections addressing compensation, the contribution and return of capital, voting rights, and service on select firm committees-for example, executive, management, or compensation committees. These facts reveal the parties' intent that non-equity partners be considered partners in their firms to the extent that status has legal ramifications. Were non-equity partners mere employees, on the other hand, there would be no need for them to sign a firm's partnership agreement or to be mentioned therein. 
Sharing Profits
The UPA and RUPA, which form the bases for state partnership statutes, define a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 116 Seizing on that definition, courts evaluating the relationship between parties generally consider an agreement to share in the profits of their common enterprise to be an essential element of a partnership.
117 Courts follow the same approach when determining whether lawyers are partners.
118
If one person is employed by another and receives a salary or wages, on the other hand, the two are not partners. 119 The widely-held belief that nonequity partners are always compensated by way of salary has fueled the common perception that they are law firm employees rather than partners.
In fact, profit-sharing is only evidence of a partnership, "rather than a required element of the definition of a partnership."
120 Even if it were a required element, law firms typically compensate non-equity partners through guaranteed payments out of firm profits.
121
Although these monthly payments resemble a salary and some lawyers describe them that way for simplicity's sake, they are not a salary-they are a share of firm profits. 122 Indeed, most law firms issue non-equity partners a Schedule K-1 for tax purposes, just as they do their equity partners. salary. 124 Firms use a Form W-2 to report wages, including salaries, paid to employees and taxes withheld from them. Furthermore, most nonequity partners bear the full cost of any self-employment taxes rather than having their firms pay any portion of them or having income taxes withheld from their monthly compensation. Again, these factors are consistent with receiving a share of firm profits rather than being paid a salary. Finally, non-equity partners are often paid bonuses from firm profits.
Law Firms' Tax Treatment of Non-equity Partners
As noted above, the fact that law firms typically issue non-equity partners Schedule K-1's and require them to pay their own selfemployment taxes is consistent with non-equity partners sharing in firm profits. These facts are also independently relevant, inasmuch as courts have long considered the good faith filing of partnership tax returns to evidence the existence of a partnership. 125 It is reasonable to assume that a law firm would not issue its non-equity partners Schedule K-1's unless it considered them to be partners. 
Sharing Losses
As important to the existence of a partnership that profit-sharing clearly is, the burden of spreading a firm's losses is equally essential.
127
Partners in general partnerships are jointly and severally liable in tort for the wrongs of their fellow partners committed in the course and scope of partnership business, and jointly liable for all other partnership debts and obligations. 128 Any suggestion that non-equity partners are not truly partners because they are not liable for a firm's losses in the same fashion as equity partners, however, misses the mark for at least two reasons. First, the partnership liability landscape has radically shifted with the proliferation of limited liability partnerships (LLPs). The vast majority of law firms organized as general partnerships have now registered as LLPs. This was to be expected, since all states permit general partnerships to do so. 129 Most LLP statutes effectively eliminate partners' vicarious liability for all partnership debts and obligations, thus providing "full shield" protection. For example, the Minnesota LLP statute provides in pertinent part:
An obligation of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited liability partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the partnership. A partner is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for such an obligation solely by reason of being or so acting as a partner.
130
Illinois has an identical "full shield" statute.
131
Other statutes provide varying degrees of so-called "partial shield" protection. For example, the Texas LLP statute provides:
A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not individually liable, directly or indirectly, by contribution, indemnity, or otherwise, for debts and obligations of the partnership arising from errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance committed while the partnership is a registered limited liability partnership and in the course of partnership business by another partner or a representative of the partnership not working under the supervision or direction of the first partner unless the first partner:
(A) was directly involved in the specific activity in which the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were committed by the other partner or representative; or (B) had notice or knowledge of the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance by the other partner or representative at the time of occurrence and then failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or cure the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance. Under both full and partial shield statutes, law firm partners remain liable for their own errors, 133 and partners in direct supervisory roles may be liable for related failures. 134 Individual partners' potential vicarious liability, however, has been eliminated or at least seriously constrained.
In short, equity partners in law firms registered as LLPs are generally shielded from liability for firm losses not caused by their own negligence or supervisory lapses. Partial shield statutes afford equity partners less protection than do full shield statutes, of course, but even a partial shield affords substantial protection against personal liability. It therefore makes little sense to argue that non-equity partners in LLPs are not true partners on the basis that they do not share in firm losses. 135 Second, non-equity partners are potentially bound to share in their firm's losses, but the firm simply indemnifies them against this risk. The firm indemnifies equity partners in the same fashion. For example, a law firm partnership agreement might provide: 136 The Firm shall, subject to the other provisions of this Section, indemnify each partner and former partner who was a partner on or after [date] (an "Indemnified Partner"), with respect to any debt, obligation, expense or liability of, or chargeable to, the Firm or such Indemnified Partner (a "Liability" or "Liabilities"), whether arising in tort, contract, or otherwise, if and to the extent such Liabilities are incurred or are assumed by such Indemnified Partner in the course of (1) engaging in the practice of law on behalf of the Firm or (2) engaging in or serving in the management of the Firm and its activities except, in each case, to the extent such Indemnified Partner has been reimbursed under a policy of insurance. No Indemnified Partner shall be entitled to indemnification for any Liability to the extent it results from such Indemnified Partner's:
(a) failure to act in good faith and in a manner in which such Indemnified Partner reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the Firm's best interests; 136. Confidentiality obligations prevent me from identifying the law firms from whose partnership agreements the following indemnification provisions are adapted.
(c) failure to comply with written Firm policies which the Executive Committee has notified the partners must, in advance of the conduct in question, be complied with as a condition of indemnification hereunder; or (d) involvement in a proceeding in which the Firm is adverse to such Indemnified Partner (except in the case of any successful proceeding brought by the Indemnified Partner to enforce a right to indemnification or expense advancement hereunder).
Alternatively, an indemnification provision in a law firm partnership agreement might state:
The partnership shall indemnify and hold harmless each partner and former partner who is or was a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether administrative, civil, or criminal (other than an action by or in the right of the partnership) by reason of the fact that such person is or was a partner, or is or was serving at the request of the partnership as a trustee or administrator of any employee benefit or welfare plan established or maintained by the partnership for the benefit of partners or employees of the partnership, against expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines (including excise taxes assessed in connection with an employee benefit plan) and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with such action, suit, or proceeding. Indemnification shall survive a partner's death, retirement, or withdrawal from the partnership. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the partnership shall not be obligated:
(a) To indemnify a partner or former partner against any liability (i) caused in whole or part by the partner's gross negligence or willful misconduct, or (ii) to the extent such indemnification would be prohibited by applicable law; (b) To indemnify a partner or former partner against liability arising from any conduct that constituted a breach of the partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership or for any transactions from which a partner or anyone affiliated with him or her derived an improper personal benefit; (c) To indemnify any partner or former partner with respect to any claim or proceeding initiated by such person against the partnership or its partners, agents or employees, unless the claim or proceeding (i) was authorized by the managing partner or (ii) is for the sole purpose of determining whether such person is entitled to indemnification hereunder; (d) To indemnify any partner or former partner for expenses or liabilities of any type whatsoever that have been paid directly to such KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
person by an insurance carrier under a policy of insurance maintained by the partnership; or (e) To indemnify a former partner in respect to obligations of the partnership or in respect of any other partner for debts owed to the partnership.
If a law firm indemnifies both equity and non-equity partners, as most do, then loss-sharing is not a substantial factor in determining whether a non-equity partner is truly a partner. Even if that were not the case, and only non-equity partners were indemnified, it would remain true that a firm's promise of indemnification is only as good as its ability to fulfill it, and if the firm is unable to do so-as perhaps in a bankruptcy or dissolution-then non-equity partners may be forced to share the firm's losses. This threat is unfortunately very real, given the many high-profile law firms that have failed in the recent past.
Finally, to the extent loss-sharing is understood to mean that true partners earn less-or nothing-in years in which the partnership business declines or is unprofitable, such that non-equity partners who receive fixed compensation cannot be "partners" as a result, loss-sharing is still not determinative. There are two reasons for this. First, some equity partners negotiate fixed or guaranteed compensation with their firms. It is especially common for lateral equity partners to have their compensation guaranteed for their first few years at their new firms. Second, law firms often do reduce non-equity partner compensation during lean periods, such that non-equity partners in fact share in firm losses so measured. 
Sharing Risk
If a court were to consider risk-sharing in evaluating whether a partnership exists, it would find nothing there to distinguish between equity and non-equity partners. First, the LLP structure that now predominates among law firm partnerships has mooted many questions of partner liability and, thus, of risk-sharing. Quite simply, many risks that partners in general partnerships once shared have been statutorily eliminated or severely restricted under the LLP regime. As a result, "risk" in the sense of the unlimited personal liability that once characterized general partners and which separated them from employees, 138 ought not be a material consideration when attempting to distinguish equity and non-equity partners in law firms. Second, law firms generally indemnify both equity and non-equity partners against most firm-or practice-related risks. The possibility that a firm might be unable to satisfy its indemnity obligations is potentially as consequential for non-equity partners as it is for equity partners. Third, law firms today insure against almost all foreseeable risks at levels sufficient to protect partners against personal liability for even calamitous errors or occurrences. Even if a risk were for some reason uninsured, or a loss or series of losses exceeded the limits of the firm's applicable insurance, in the great majority of cases equity partners would still be insulated against personal liability by virtue of the firm's status as an LLP. One factor courts may consider in determining if a partnership exists is whether the parties exercise or participate in joint control over the enterprise, 140 or at least have the right to do so. 141 The rationale long offered for this rule is that control of a business enterprise "is so crucial that it is rarely entrusted to mere employees or independent contractors."
142
Applying this rationale to typical two-tier law firm partnerships leads to the conclusion that non-equity partners are generally bona fide partners. In typical two-tier firms, for example, nonequity partners vote on a variety of partnership matters, 143 and often vote on all matters except the election of equity partners.
144
Non-equity partners generally attend partnership meetings, participate in various aspects of firm management, and sit on firm committees. generally have the right to view the law firm's financial records. 146 The fact that non-equity partners do not enjoy as much control over firm affairs as do equity partners does not force a different conclusion as to their status.
147
It is also important when analyzing the issue of joint control to consider the effect of centralized management on law firms, which "is a departure from the basic partnership norm of equal participation in [firm] management."
148
The traditional partnership structure in which the partners decide matters through common agreement and consensus no longer exists in many law firms. 149 In typical large and mid-sized firms, most managerial decisions are entrusted to a managing partner, or executive or management committee. 150 The few partnership decisions that these lawyers do not make are often delegated to select partners functioning as practice-group leaders. Other operational decisions are left to non-partner managers holding titles such as "chief operating officer," "executive director," or "firm administrator." Partner compensation decisions are entrusted to a compensation or policy committee. New lawyers are selected by hiring committees. Firms' futures are plotted by strategic planning committees. In many large and mid-sized law firms, equity partners' "joint control" is limited to electing colleagues to serve on the committees that manage all aspects of firm affairs. Those elections are controlled by nominating committees and other groups selected or influenced by firm management, further reducing equity partners' actual control over management of the enterprise. Even small law firms delegate most operational decisions to a managing partner. In summary, traditional conceptions of joint control of partnership affairs are clearly outdated in the large and mid-sized law firm context, where firms have essentially "outgrown the law under which they operate," 151 
Capital Contributions
Courts sometimes reason that the contribution of capital by members of an alleged partnership weighs favorably in finding that a partnership exists. 152 It is certainly true that a person's capital contribution to an enterprise may indicate the existence of a partnership. There is, however, no requirement that partners contribute capital in order to create a partnership, or that a person must contribute capital to become a partner. 153 The fact that non-equity partners do not contribute capital to their firms is therefore irrelevant to their status as a matter of partnership law. Curiously, some firms require non-equity partners to contribute capital-albeit less than that required of equity partners-with the nonequity partners then receiving fixed incomes rather than variable, and generally greater, incomes tied to the firm's profitability. 154 To the extent that a partner who contributes capital to a firm can be fairly described as "non-equity," which seems like quite a reach, non-equity partners in these firms obviously are more likely to be characterized or treated as bona fide partners for all purposes.
Holding Out as Partners
Law firms hold out non-equity partners to the public as partners just as they do their equity partners. Firms do not distinguish between equity and non-equity partners on their websites, on their letterhead, on lawyers' business cards, in legal directories, in their hourly billing rates, in their public announcements of lateral hires, or in their marketing materials. As an annual rite, law firms announce the election of new partners without distinguishing between equity and non-equity partners. Law firms permit non-equity partners to describe themselves as partners to courts, lawyers at other firms, existing clients, prospective clients, CLE program audiences, and the like. The public generally cannot distinguish between equity and non-equity partners, and has no idea if a law firm has two partnership tiers. 155 The same is often true of law firm clients. If a firm publicly represents that a lawyer is a partner and a third-party reasonably relies on that representation, that lawyer has apparent authority to perform all acts that a partner in the firm ordinarily would.
156
In some cases, this kind of holding out may result in partnership by estoppel vis-à-vis third-parties. 157 It is true that even where the rights and duties of partnership exist in relation to third parties, the relation between partners themselves remains consensual.
158
A good argument can therefore be made that "partnership" has a different meaning within a firm as compared to without. Nonetheless, the fact that firms allow non-equity partners to hold themselves out as partners is compelling evidence that the equity partners in those firms intend a true partnership with their non-equity colleagues. If they did not, they would require that non-equity partners identify themselves as "counsel," "senior counsel," "special counsel," or "senior attorney," rather than using the title "partner."
It is difficult for law firms to convincingly argue that non-equity partners are not partners for agency law or vicarious-liability purposes given the fashion in which they hold them out to the world as partners.
159
It is similarly disingenuous for non-equity partners to hold themselves out as partners when it is beneficial to do so but then deny or disclaim partner status when it has negative ramifications. To deny partnership in either instance is to arguably engage in multiple ethical violations.
For example, for a firm's equity partners to claim that a non-equity partner who has been held out as a partner is not one is to potentially acknowledge deceit, dishonesty, and misrepresentation in those activities, and thus to admit violations of Model Rule 8.4(c). 160 Such a claim might also be alleged to violate Model Rule 7.1, which prohibits lawyers from making false or misleading communications about their services;
161 Model Rule 7.5(a), which forbids lawyers from using a professional designation that violates Rule 7.1; 162 partnership only when that is the fact.
163
At least one bar's ethics committee has reached some similar conclusions. 164 On the law firm side, all equity partners will end up being liable under Model Rule 5.1(a) for allowing those violations to occur. 165 From the individual lawyer's perspective, the fact that the firm allowed or encouraged her to hold herself out as a partner is no defense to alleged violations of Rules 7.1, 7.5, and 8.4(c), because lawyers are bound by ethics rules even when they are acting at the direction of another person. 166 
C. Summary and Synthesis
"Partnership" is an imprecise term. 167 It refers to a contractual relationship that may vary widely in form and substance. 168 Partners do not even have to appreciate that they are partners for a partnership to exist. 169 Viewing partnership in this light, and considering the factors discussed previously, it is apparent that non-equity law firm partners are generally "partners" in the full legal meaning and context of the term. On the factors most critical to courts charged with evaluating alleged partnership relations-profit-sharing, loss-sharing, and joint control or equal participation in management-equity and non-equity partners are closely aligned.
Also important to courts evaluating whether partnerships exist is whether law firms clearly hold out their non-equity partners as partners. This they generally do. The differences between equity and non-equity partners-e.g., equity partners receive a greater share of firm profits because their income is not fixed, equity partners vote on admitting lawyers to equity partnership while non-equity 163. R. 7.5(d). 164. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. No. 740 (2008) (analyzing thenNew York DR 2-102(C), which, much like Model Rule 7.5(d), prohibited lawyers from holding themselves out as having a partnership with other lawyers unless they were in fact partners; applying that rule to law firms holding out non-equity partners as "partners;" and concluding that DR 2-102(C) required "that attorneys holding themselves out to the public as partners, and the law firms in which they practice, be in fact partners under New York partnership law and their individual partnership agreements").
165. R. 5.1(a) (providing that "[a] partner in a law firm . . . shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct").
166. R. partners do not vote-do not foreclose the conclusion that non-equity partners are partners for purposes of partnership law. The essential question is what it means to acknowledge that nonequity partners are true partners. Certainly, accepting this conclusion has external implications for law firms and non-equity partners in terms of agency and vicarious liability. It is less clear that non-equity partners' status as true partners for partnership-law purposes is meaningful within law firm confines. Partnership is a contractual relation as well as a fiduciary one, and partners are generally free to fix their rights by agreement. 170 Thus, when it comes to their relations with their colleagues and firms, non-equity partners generally enjoy only those privileges and rights granted them in their firms' partnership agreements. Their status as partners rather than employees does not, for example, entitle them to share in firm profits or assets contrary to the language in a partnership agreement, or allow them voting rights other than those contractually conferred.
Non-equity partners' status as partners may be consequential, however, where a law firm attempts to sever its relationship with them. The termination of a partner is referred to as expulsion, and expelling partners can be a difficult and potentially perilous exercise. 171 A law firm that wishes to expel a partner must carefully adhere to the expulsion provision in its partnership agreement. 172 The failure to do so exposes a firm to liability for breach of contract. 173 In addition, the partner relation "is a fiduciary one, a relation of trust" that "carries with it the requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty."
174 Thus, a law firm that wishes to expel a partner must satisfy itself that its decision will withstand allegations of bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty by the expelled partner. Although it is true that partners' fiduciary duties to one another are substantially shaped by the terms of their partnership agreement, 175 good faith and bad faith remain imprecise concepts. In contrast, a law firm that wishes to terminate an associate's or of-counsel- lawyer's employment must only concern itself with much clearer antidiscrimination laws.
Recognizing non-equity partners as bona fide partners also has major professional responsibility implications. Unlike associates and other employed lawyers, partners have broad supervisory responsibility for the conduct of other lawyers in their firm. Partners must make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to rules of professional conduct.
176
A partner who breaches this duty may be sanctioned apart and independent from any discipline imposed on the lawyers to whom her failure relates. 177 Under Model Rule 5.1(c)(2), a partner is responsible for another lawyer's violation of ethics rules if she knows of the other lawyer's conduct "at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action."
178 Partners have nearly identical professional responsibilities with respect to non-lawyer assistants.
179
III. DE-EQUITIZATION
As explained previously, one of the paths that lawyers take to nonequity status is a descending one. Firms commonly de-equitize partners whom they perceive to be under-productive or unproductive. For example, equity partnership is generally considered to require as essential qualifications the ability and willingness to attract new clients to a firm, the ability to retain existing clients, the capability to meet practice goals with a high degree of knowledge and skill, and the ability and willingness to accept independent responsibility for significant client matters. These are not the only attributes required of equity partners, but they are critical ones. Two-tier firms understandably operate on the basis that partners who do not satisfy all of these criteria should not enjoy equity status. Firms may also de-equitize partners as punishment for disruptive internal behavior or major transgressions, such as conduct that materially impairs a key client relationship, or that is unprofessional or exposes the firm to liability. 179. See R. 5.3(a) (providing that partners must make reasonable efforts to ensure that nonlawyer assistants' conduct is compatible with lawyers' professional obligations); R. 5.3(c)(2) (making partners responsible for non-lawyer assistants' misconduct where they know of it at a time that it can be avoided or mitigated but fail to take remedial action). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
In recent years, law firms have de-equitized partners as a means of increasing profitability. 180 This trend began in the 1990s and continues unabated. 181 De-equitization is a superficially simple means of ratcheting up profitability, because the key measure of law firm profitability is profits per partner, and profits per partner are calculated solely based on a firm's equity partners. Among some groups, a firm's willingness to deequitize partners is regarded as a sign of financial health. 182 In other instances, de-equitization is perceived to have sinister overtones, 183 as this tip in a blog post about partner de-equitizations at a large Chicago law firm reflects:
Management just voted themselves massive raises while cutting the points of partners who are not politically connected. . . . [O] ver the last few days, management is going office to office de-equitizing and partially de-equitizing tons of partners in an effort to raise the profits per partner number. Those partners who are being de-equitized are no different than those who are permitted to keep their equity except those whose status remained intact have friends on management. 184 When it comes to firms' ability to de-equitize partners, partnership statutes are silent. The drafters of the UPA and RUPA never contemplated de-equitization. Of course, partnership is a contractual relation. 185 Partners may generally fix their rights by agreement. 186 It follows that a law firm's right to de-equitize partners arises, if at all, from its partnership agreement. Attempting to de-equitize a partner absent a provision permitting that measure breaches the partnership agreement and potentially entitles the partner to damages. The interpretation of a partnership agreement is a question of law.
187
An as-yet unanswered question is whether an expulsion provision in a partnership agreement is sufficient to authorize the lesser action of de-equitization. Logic suggests that it should be, even though the actions are different. There is no compelling argument to the contrary. Partnership being a voluntary relation, a law firm's right to completely sever a partner's relationship with it impliedly encompasses the right to distance or reduce that relationship. A partner who is unwilling to accept de-equitization is free to withdraw from the firm. It would make no sense for a partner in a law firm with a partnership agreement that provided only for expulsion to contest her de-equitization on the ground that it was not contractually permitted when the probable consequence of her resistance would be expulsion. Furthermore, law firm compensation processes provided for in partnership agreements typically allow firms to reduce partner compensation to levels so low that equity status is valueless, or nearly so.
188 That being so, permitting de-equitization in the absence of express authority in a partnership agreement seems unremarkable. As a practical matter, firms often present de-equitization as an alternative to expulsion, and with most partnership agreements clearly permitting the latter and courts routinely upholding law firms' expulsion decisions, 189 most lawyers have little incentive to contest the issue.
In addition to the rights conferred under a partnership agreement, partners owe one another a duty of good faith and fair dealing that obliges them to consider their co-partners' welfare in addition to their own. 190 Partners cannot use the partnership agreement to contract away their duty of good faith and fair dealing. 191 The duty of good faith and fair dealing either arises from the partnership agreement or is among partners' fiduciary duties to one another. Some courts and partnership scholars consider partners' duty of good faith and fair dealing to be a creature of contract, which is logical considering that partnership agreements are contracts and the law implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts. 192 Traditionally, however, courts have framed the duty of good faith in intra-partner affairs as an aspect or extension of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 193 Regardless of the duty's source, it clearly applies to firms' decisions to de-equitize partners. It is therefore critical to determine what constitutes good faith, or perhaps more appropriately, what conduct evidences bad faith. Partnership statutes offer little guidance here. For example, RUPA leaves to courts the task of defining good faith and fair dealing "based on the experience of real cases." 194 RUPA presumes that courts will treat the good faith requirement as an exclusionary test, such that the phrase "good faith and fair dealing" has no general meaning of its own, but instead "'functions to rule out many different forms of bad faith. '" 195 In addition to the exclusionary test, courts evaluating allegations of bad faith may employ a cost-of-contracting analysis. 196 Cost-of-contracting analysis asks whether discretion in performing the contract, here a partnership agreement, is exercised in a fashion consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations. 197 The party vested with discretion in a matter breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing if it exercises its discretion in order to recapture its cost of contracting or to deprive the other party of the benefit of the bargain. 198 Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate whether either the exclusionary approach or cost-of-contracting analysis is preferable when analyzing the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the de-equitization context.
Despite firms' widespread use of de-equitization as a management tool, there is a dearth of case law on the subject. There are several reasons for this. First, firms often present de-equitization as an alternative to expulsion or force it upon partners who lack professional alternatives; it is thus the lesser of two evils in each case. Firms routinely offer to return de-equitized partners' capital to them sooner than required under the partnership agreement and provide other sweeteners as incentives to acquiesce in their demotions. In any event, de-equitization is presented in such a way or at such a time that contesting it is not a viable option. Second, partners who consider deequitization intolerable may negotiate separation agreements with their firms and thereby avoid disputes. Third, many law firm partnership agreements include arbitration provisions, meaning that de-equitization disputes are contested privately. Fourth, when partners do challenge their de-equitization, and those challenges reasonably appear to be legitimate, firms are inclined to confidentially settle with the partner rather than risk any reputational injury that may attend litigation. Fifth, many de-equitized partners likely view suing their law firms as career suicide. Litigation will materially disrupt their current environment, may diminish their ability to move to another firm, and may ruin key relationships. Sixth, for insecure partners who have been worried about their futures, de-equitization may be a relief from the pressures they feel, and thus be an acceptable step, especially if the compensation offered with the change is palatable.
Kehoe v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon is a rare case in which a partner's de-equitization was fully litigated.
199
The plaintiff, Robert Kehoe, was elected to equity partnership with Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon ("Wildman") in 1979.
200
In 1994, the firm's management committee reviewed the productivity of all partners and negotiated separation packages with ten of them. 201 Those partners resigned from the firm and received benefits normally paid to partners upon involuntary withdrawal.
202
The management committee discussed Kehoe's productivity but took no action against him.
203
In November 1995, the partnership approved a loan agreement with American National Bank (ANB) that required each equity partner to execute a guaranty in a form acceptable to ANB. By February 1996, every equity partner except Kehoe had executed a personal guaranty; Kehoe refused to do so on the basis that he found some provisions in ANB's proposed guaranty to be unacceptable. 204 He said he would be willing to execute a personal guaranty if his concerns about the guaranty were satisfied. In July 1996, the firm negotiated with ANB to modify some of the guaranty provisions to which Kehoe had objected. 208 In Kehoe's mind, these amendments eliminated the need for him to provide a personal guaranty.
209
Although John Eisel, who chaired the management committee, told Kehoe that ANB still wanted a personal guaranty from every partner, Eisel never pressed the issue.
210 ANB never approached Kehoe about his failure to execute a guaranty.
211
In a November 1996 partnership meeting, the management committee proposed a resolution that would allow the firm to de-equitize any partner who failed to personally guarantee the ANB loan. 212 At the time, the firm's partnership agreement provided that a partner could be de-equitized by an affirmative vote of at least sixty-seven percent of the partnership interests. 213 Eisel presented the resolution to the partnership. Kehoe was present and was given the opportunity to speak, and he explained his objections. 214 The resolution was put to a vote, and fiftyfive of the firm's sixty-one equity partners voted for it. 215 Afterwards, several partners implored Kehoe to sign a guaranty in order to preserve his status as an equity partner, but he declined to do so. 216 The resolution took effect on January 1, 1997, and Wildman then considered Kehoe a non-equity partner.
217
On January 2, Kehoe requested that Wildman pay him his capital.
218
The firm refused.
219
Kehoe then sued Wildman and six partners-including Eisel and the other members of the management committee-for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. 220 Kehoe alleged that he should receive his capital as separation payments provided for in the partnership agreement as though he had involuntarily withdrawn from the firm, which would entitle him to a payout of $405,116. 221 The firm countered that Kehoe's change in status from equity to non-equity partner was merely that-a change in status. 222 He was still allowed to practice law at Wildman. When he later chose to leave the firm, he did so voluntarily, and thus was not entitled to separation payments as though he had involuntarily withdrawn.
223
The trial court determined that the Wildman partnership agreement was ambiguous and instructed the jury to determine whether Kehoe's deequitization amounted to an involuntary withdrawal from the firm. 224 The jury found for Kehoe on both his breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims and awarded damages of $405,116. 225 After the trial court denied their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the defendants appealed.
226
The Kehoe court first took up the issue of whether Wildman's partnership agreement was ambiguous, that is, whether it was "'capable of being understood in more sense than one.'" 227 In doing so, it noted that the defendants focused on the agreement's separation payments provision, which stated:
If an equity partner's separation results from his or her involuntary withdrawal, the firm shall pay to the withdrawn partner . . . a sum equal to twice his or her Base Amount. Payment shall be made in one hundred twenty (120) equal monthly installments, commencing on the last day of the month following the month in which separation occurred.
228
The plaintiff, on the other hand, honed in on the agreement's definition of involuntary withdrawal, which provided:
The term "involuntary withdrawal" . . . shall mean the withdrawal of a partner from the firm as a result of (i) action taken by the other partners, which action shall be by not less than sixty-seven percent of the share interest held by the partners; (ii) compelling reasons of health, which shall be defined as any condition preventing said individual from The court focused on the portion of the involuntary withdrawal definition that spoke of "action taken by the other partners." 230 The defendants argued that there could be no involuntary withdrawal without a partner being required to withdraw from the firm, but the court found no such requirement in the definition of involuntary withdrawal. 231 Because Kehoe withdrew from the firm as a result of the sufficient partnership vote to de-equitize him, his withdrawal was arguably involuntary and the jury was free to so decide. 232 The fact that Kehoe might have chosen to remain with Wildman as a non-equity partner instead of withdrawing did not cure the ambiguity. As the court explained:
The "involuntary withdrawal" provision was capable of being understood as applying to withdrawal of a partner when his withdrawal is required by the requisite vote of the other partners or where the action taken by the requisite vote of the other partners forced, but did not compel, the withdrawal of a partner. Contrary to the Firm's implied argument, the express provisions of the agreement do not, as a matter of law, require that at least 67% of the partners "vote to terminate" the plaintiff as a partner . . . before separation benefits are owed. . . . That the plaintiff was "welcome to, and indeed expected to, practice law at the firm after January 1, 1997" as a nonequity partner did not preclude the jury from deciding that the plaintiff was entitled to separation benefits because he was forced to withdraw by the passage of the resolution . . . .
233
While the court affirmed the judgment against Wildman for breach of contract, it reversed the judgment against the individual defendants on the same theory. 234 This was an easy decision because the partnership agreement stated that the firm was obligated to pay all separation benefits from its net income. 235 The court rejected Kehoe's claim that the individual defendants were liable as a matter of partnership law on the basis that he had not alleged a violation of the Illinois partnership law-he had alleged a breach of contract, and the contract made clear that separation benefits were a firm obligation.
236
The court next turned to Kehoe's breach of fiduciary duty claim. Kehoe alleged that the individual defendants had breached fiduciary duties to him by (a) failing to advise the other partners of the July 1996 amendments to the guaranty requirement, (b) advising the other partners that he was unwilling to execute a guaranty, (c) not advising him that not all partners supplied personal financial statements, (d) implying that his refusal to execute a guaranty jeopardized the firm's financing, (e) not telling the other partners that his concerns might be satisfactorily resolved, (f) recommending the de-equitization resolution so as to terminate his partnership, and (g) providing a pretextual rationale for the resolution.
237
Kehoe's breach of fiduciary duty claim quickly floundered in light of Illinois precedent focusing on partners' fiduciary obligations not to make secret profits at their co-partners' expense and to fully disclose to other partners all information that may be of value to the partnership.
238
Kehoe's allegations did not remotely approach a claim that the individual defendants' actions constituted secret dealings contrary to the partnership's interests, that their actions somehow deprived Wildman of profits it otherwise would have earned, or that by voting to de-equitize him, the defendants somehow enriched or enhanced themselves at the firm's expense.
239 Furthermore:
The requisite number of partners might well have voted in favor of the resolution even if they had been provided with the information the plaintiff contends was either concealed or misstated for the most obvious reason: to remain an equity partner, one had to agree to share the same risks with the other partners. . . . . . . .
[A]s the partner defendants point out, the plaintiff was provided an opportunity to argue his position against the adoption of the resolution at the [partnership] Finally, Kehoe's breach of fiduciary duty claims against the individual defendants were inextricably linked to his contract claim against the firm. The damages sought for the alleged fiduciary breaches were based solely on the firm's failure to pay Kehoe separation benefits he was due. 241 Had the firm read the partnership agreement the way the jury did and paid Kehoe separation benefits, the partners' vote for the resolution permitting his de-equitization would have been irrelevant. 242 Accordingly, Kehoe's breach of fiduciary duty claims against his former partners failed for a lack of proximate cause. 243 While the Kehoe court ultimately affirmed the plaintiff's judgment against Wildman for breach of contract, it reversed the trial court in all other respects.
244
Kehoe is unremarkable from a contract law perspective. Wildman's partnership agreement was vague and the firm paid for that imprecision. As for Kehoe's breach of fiduciary duty claim, it is settled that a law firm may expel a partner for conduct that produces a partnership schism without the partners who vote for expulsion breaching their duties of good faith and fair dealing to the partner voted out.
245
By analogy, partners should be able to vote to de-equitize a co-partner who creates a schism in their firm without being guilty of a fiduciary breach.
Partners breach their duty of good faith and fair dealing if they expel a co-partner for economically predatory purposes or for exercising rights conferred under their partnership agreement.
246
The same principles necessarily apply to partner de-equitizations. Thus, Kehoe might have been able to sustain a tort claim if he could have demonstrated that the partners he sued acted predatorily in supporting the resolution that allowed his demotion. That appears to have been what he was getting at when he alleged that those partners provided a "pretextual rationale" for the resolution. 247 The problem for Kehoe was that no evidence showed that he was de-equitized for economically predatory purposes. The resolution that imperiled his equity interest was well known to him; indeed, Kehoe was allowed to speak in opposition to it at the partnership meeting at which the resolution was called to a vote.
248 Although Kehoe's de-equitization might seem petty given that his unwillingness to execute a personal guaranty was apparently inconsequential to ANB, the record indicates that he was demoted for his disharmonious behavior rather than as a pretext to steal his clients or unfairly re-distribute his share of firm profits. Colleagues implored him to change his position to avoid de-equitization, yet he stubbornly refused to do so. 249 There was nothing to suggest that their efforts were insincere, or that the lawyers who urged Kehoe to reconsider his position were unaware of a management plot against him. The fact that a more charitable law firm might not have de-equitized Kehoe for his intransigence does not mean that the Wildman partners breached their duties of good faith and fair dealing by proceeding as they did. Kehoe had ample opportunities to avoid being de-equitized and squandered them all.
From a practical perspective, two-tier partnerships must be able to demote equity partners for legitimate reasons if they are to function efficiently. If, for example, a law firm is unable or unwilling to deequitize undeserving or unproductive equity partners, or equity partners who no longer satisfy the criteria for equity status, then valued nonequity partners and aspiring associates will quickly come to see the twotier system as artificial and unfair. There is substantial risk that they will eventually become dissatisfied with the partnership structure and their related prospects to the point that they leave the firm, thereby undoing all the benefits that two-tier partnership was intended to achieve.
If either courts or lawyers are tempted to downplay this functional need, there are at least four reasons they ought not to. First, most law firms have equity partners who achieved that status before the firms converted to two-tier partnerships. Were some of those same partners up for partnership today, they would be considered only for non-equity positions. It is unfair to their colleagues, and unhealthy for their firms, for these partners to escape the accountability or productivity that they require of those aspiring to their partner status. Firms must be able to deequitize partners fitting this description if their performance warrants it. Second, lawyers' practices commonly change over time. If changes to equity partners' practices are negative from a profitability standpoint or otherwise, firms must be able to address those changes. De-equitization may be an appropriate adjustment in some instances. Third, some equity 250 Lawyers may change firms several times over their careers. For gifted non-equity partners and associates who are dissatisfied with their firms' partnership structures, relocation to other firms is often a viable option.
IV. PARTNERSHIP AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Non-equity partnership has perhaps drawn the most attention for its employment law aspects. 251 During recessions and times of economic stress for individual law firms, non-equity partners are thought to be vulnerable to layoffs. 252 This perceived vulnerability is principally attributable to the perception that non-equity partners are employees rather than partners. 253 The belief that non-equity partners are employees has employment law implications in that anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) protect "employees" against unlawful discrimination.
254 As a rule, partners are considered to be employers, not employees, and, therefore, are not protected against adverse employment action under federal anti-discrimination laws.
255 This is particularly true in the law firm context. 256 Courts have historically been reluctant to extend employment law principles "to the management of a law firm by its partners" given that the relationships among law partners "differ markedly" from employer-employee relationships.
257
Courts' traditional differentiation between partners and employees when enforcing anti-discrimination laws has been viewed by some as being one of the chief benefits of non-equity partner status. It is highly doubtful that any lawyer would favor non-equity over equity partnership based on potential employment law protections, and it is only minimally more likely that lawyers who have achieved any partnership status give the employment law ramifications of their positions a moment's thought until professional disaster looms. For that matter, it is seldom easy for a plaintiff to prove a claim under federal anti-discrimination statutes, and the mere right to sue under such laws probably affords savvy lawyers little comfort. Even if state antidiscrimination laws are more favorable to plaintiffs than their federal analogs, it is still doubtful that they offer lawyers meaningful assurance. Regardless, the distinction between equity and non-equity partnership is simply not the momentous employment law consideration that lawyers and scholars may believe. Courts have recognized for a while now that the centralized management common among large professional partnerships has so blurred the line between partners and employees that partners may sometimes enjoy the protection of anti-discrimination laws. 260 The title "partner" is not itself determinative in employment disputes. 261 For law firms, the partner versus employee paradigm materially shifted in 2002 with the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. 262 The Sidley case arose out of a 1999 decision by the leaders of Sidley & Austin ("Sidley"), as the firm was then known, to demote thirty-two equity partners to "counsel" or "senior counsel" status. 263 None of the demoted partners filed a charge of discrimination against the firm.
264
Even so, the EEOC launched an investigation into the firm's possible violation of the ADEA and subpoenaed a variety of information from the firm. To prove an ADEA violation, the EEOC had to show that the partners were in fact employees before their demotions. 265 When Sidley resisted the subpoena the district court ordered the firm to comply fully and Sidley appealed.
266
Sidley challenged the EEOC's jurisdiction to investigate the demotions on the basis that a partner is an employer within the meaning of the federal anti-discrimination laws if (a) her income included a share of the firm's profits, (b) she contributed capital to the firm, (c) she is liable for firm debts, and (d) she has some administrative or managerial duties.
267
The court's focus, however, quickly shifted to the firm's centralized management structure: the firm was controlled by an executive committee that held the other partners at its "mercy" by controlling their income and status within the firm.
268
Sidley had met Illinois's requirements for forming and maintaining a partnership, and the demoted partners certainly were partners for state law purposes. 269 The EEOC, however, argued that partner status was not the same for purposes of state and federal law. 270 The court's concern was whether the partners were employers under the ADEA, and the court was not satisfied that partner status established employer status. As the court explained in comparing the firm to a corporation: This case . . . . involves a partnership of more than 500 partners in which all power resides in a small, unelected committee (it has 36 members). The partnership does not elect the members of the executive committee; the committee elects them, like the selfperpetuating board of trustees of a private university or other charitable foundation. It is true that the partners can commit the firm, for example by writing opinion letters; but employees of a corporation, when acting within the scope of their employment, regularly commit the corporation to contractual undertakings, not to mention tort liability. Partners who are not members of the executive committee share in the profits of the firm; but many corporations base their employees' compensation in part anyway, but sometimes in very large part, on the corporation's profits, without anyone supposing them employers. The participation of the 32 demoted partners in committees that have . . . merely administrative functions does not distinguish them from executive employees in corporations. Corporations have committees and the members of the committees are employees; this does not make them employers. Nor are the members of the committees on which the 32 serve elected; they are appointed by the executive committee. The 32 owned some of the firm's capital, but executive-level employees often own stock in their corporations. . . . [T] here is authority that employee shareholders of professional corporations are still employees, not employers, for purposes of federal antidiscrimination law.
271
The court found the demoted partners' personal liability for the firm's debts significant, but this factor did not outweigh the other considerations. 272 The fact that the demoted partners were bona fide partners did not determine whether they were employers, and their personal liability was relevant only to the former. 273 It was conceivable that the two classes at issue-partners under state law and employers under federal law-did not overlap. 274 The Sidley case ultimately settled for the collective sum of $27.5 million. 275 For purposes of the settlement, Sidley also admitted that the demoted partners were employees within the meaning of the ADEA. 276 Of course, the firm did not admit that it violated the ADEA in demoting them. 277 The Sidley court did not hold that the demoted partners were employees, or that they were entitled to ADEA protection. The decision should not be interpreted to mean that law firms cannot de-equitize or expel partners who are not performing the functions expected of partners, or who are not doing so satisfactorily. The case is of lasting significance, however, because equity partners are increasingly vulnerable to dramatic compensation adjustments and involuntary separation from their firms as part of firms' continuing quest to enhance, or at least maintain, their profitability. 278 As a result of the Sidley decision, law firms making such decisions now consider the employment law aspects of them more carefully than they perhaps previously appreciated or understood.
Shortly after Sidley was decided, the Supreme Court, in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, was called upon to determine whether four physicians who were shareholder-directors in a professional corporation were employees within the meaning of the ADA.
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Focusing on the element of control, the Court identified six factors that are relevant to the determination of whether a shareholder-director is an employee: (1) whether the organization can hire or fire the individual, or set the rules and regulations governing her work, (2) whether and to what extent the firm organization supervises the individual's work, (3) whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization, (4) whether and to what extent the individual is able to influence the organization, (5) whether the parties intended the individual be an employee as expressed in written agreements or contracts, and (6) whether the individual shares in the organization's liabilities, losses, and profits. 280 These factors are not exhaustive, 281 and no one of them alone is decisive.
The Court in Clackamas focused on whether a professional corporation was an employer under the ADA; it did not address whether a director-shareholder could sue such an organization for unlawful discrimination.
283
It is clear, however, that courts may employ the Clackamas factors to determine whether law firm partners are employees for employment law purposes. 284 Solon v. Kaplan illustrates the application of the Clackamas factors in the law firm context. 285 James Solon was one of four equity partners in a Chicago law firm organized as a general partnership. 286 He served as the firm's managing partner for approximately two years and, after relinquishing that post, remained involved in the firm's administration. 287 Unfortunately, the firm's three name partners lost confidence in Solon's administrative, legal, and rainmaking skills, and decided to remove him as a partner. 288 They offered him the option of remaining with the firm as an administrator or independent contractor, but he refused.
289 Solon left the firm and then sued it and the name partners for allegedly violating Title VII and the ADEA in connection with his departure.
290
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and Solon appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit applied the Clackamas factors and concluded that "no reasonable juror could find that Solon was an employee of the firm."
291 Without delving into all the details, Solon was one of four equity partners and could be removed only by a unanimous vote of the other three partners; he exercised substantial control over the allocation of the firm's profits; because new equity partners could be added only by a unanimous vote of the existing equity partners, he possessed veto power over new partner admissions; and, unlike the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 firm's "special partners," he shared in the firm's profits, had access to the firm's financial information, and attended partnership meetings. 292 The fact that the firm forced him out without affording him notice and an opportunity to be heard did not reveal a lack of control supporting his characterization as an employee, nor did the fact that he consulted with his fellow partners before making major decisions in his role as managing partner. The firm's partnership agreement did not require notice or a hearing as a condition of removing a partner, 293 and Solon's collaborative leadership style suggested only that he was "passive"-not "powerless." 294 The Solon court thus affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. 295 At the end of the day, whether law firm partners are entitled to the protection of anti-discrimination laws pivots not on their status as equity partners or non-equity partners, but on their workplace control as measured by the Clackamas factors. The greater the level of partners' control over their professional environments, the less likely they are to be considered employees for anti-discrimination law purposes. That said, not all partners must be equal. For example, a firm's differentiation between partners based on the size of their equity interests does not automatically transform partners with relatively small equity interests into employees. 296 As a Texas federal court has explained:
The Clackamas inquiry is designed to identify situations in which an employee is given a title traditionally reserved for someone in an ownership position without any of the attendant rights, privileges, and responsibilities of control. In such an instance, a shareholder, director, or partner may in fact be an employee. However, the Clackamas inquiry does not suggest that a partner in a partnership may be designated as an "employee" merely because some other partner has The outcome of any case decided by application of the Clackamas factors will turn on its facts. Partnerships are not all alike. Depending on the characteristics of the law firm, equity partners may be able to establish that they are employees within the meaning of antidiscrimination laws, just as non-equity partners might. 299 On the other hand, equity partners who hold nominal stakes in their firms and are vulnerable to domination by more senior partners with greater interests may still be deemed bona fide partners and not employees for purposes of anti-discrimination laws. 300 Equity versus non-equity partner status, without more, is simply not the meaningful employment law divide that many lawyers and observers seem to believe.
V. CONCLUSION
Two-tier partnerships are now standard in large and mid-sized law firms. Non-equity partner ranks are growing far faster and larger than equity partner numbers. It is therefore important to understand what it means to be a non-equity partner. Contrary to the many claims by lawyers and scholars that non-equity partners are not true partners, in most cases that is exactly what they are as a matter of partnership law. There are differences between equity and non-equity partners to be sure, but none relegate non-equity partners to some lesser category of association. As with equity partners, non-equity partners' rights and obligations are principally determined by their firms' partnership agreements. Equity and non-equity partners have equal supervisory responsibilities under ethics rules. Both equity and non-equity partners may be entitled to protection against unlawful employment actions under federal and state anti-discrimination laws depending on the facts of the particular case. Courts, lawyers, and scholars must understand that the proper emphasis in the term "non-equity partner" is not on "non-equity," but on "partner." 
